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The book, Ontology After Carnap is a collection of new essays mainly 
covering contemporary topics in meta-ontology. Many of the essays do not 
focus on providing a deeper understanding of the work of Carnap, and this 
much is admitted in several essays, and so this would not be a great collec-
tion for someone looking strictly into Carnap. However, the depth of con-
tent in the collected essays would make this book well worth it for anyone 
interested in contemporary meta-ontology. It includes good mix of work 
both in favor and critical of neo-Carnapian ontology. The essays assume a 
general understanding of contemporary meta-ontology, and in what follows 
so will I. In what follows I discuss a few of the essays that provide a general 
outline of what sort of concerns there are for neo-Carnapians.
Carnap famously presented us with the idea of linguistic frameworks 
and the distinction between internal and external questions. Linguistic 
frameworks for Carnap were formal languages, although the contemporary 
incarnations of this idea typically avoid formality. Thomas Hofweber, in his 
essays “Carnap’s Big Idea”, gives us an update to the internal/external dis-
tinction, focusing on whether this distinction can be compatible with factual 
work in ontology. Hofweber formulates the internal/external distinction 
in terms of quantifiers. He proposes that there are two different roles for 
quantifiers, the inferential role and the domain-conditions roles. Under the 
inferential role, a quantified sentence, “There is(x) F(x)” is satisfied by any 
sentence “F(t)” given “the schema ‘F(t) thus something id F’ is valid”. The 
domain-conditions role directly points to a domain of objects, or tries to 
pick out existing things. These two readings clearly fall closely in line with 
Carnap’s own distinction, the inferential role being similar to internal ques-
tions and the domain-conditions being external. However, Hofweber does 
not want to deny content to external questions the way that Carnap would. 
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Domain-conditions questions can be factual, as it can be shownthatsome-
thingsexist.Movingawayfromastrictuseoflinguistic frameworks allows for 
Hofweber to incorporate Carnap’s internal/external distinction in a way 
that allows for work in ontology to be factual.
Stephen Biggs and Jessica Wilson take up concern with contemporary 
approaches to modal semantics similar to Carnap’s in their essay, “Carnap, 
the Necessary A Posteriori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism”. In particular, 
they focus on some forms of two-dimensional semantics and argue that re-
solving indeterminacy in these languages undercuts any anti-metaphysical 
leanings a neo-Carnapian may have tied up with this semantics. Biggs and 
Wilson argue that there are particular issues that arise due to indeterminacy 
of our language, and this is why Carnap developed his concept of expli-
cation. Explication is necessary for resolving this indeterminacy. However, 
they also argue that Carnap sneaks theoretical virtues into his concept of ex-
plication, and these theoretical virtues are abductive. They have, therefore, 
argued that Carnap’s view of explication is actually a notion of inference to 
the best explanation. They then go on to argue abductive reasoning about 
intensions in semantics provides a priori knowledge. Requiring inference to 
the best explanation in semantics, the metaphysician can now make claim 
to this methodology themselves. This now allows metaphysician a toolkit 
with which to work, and so anti-metaphysical leanings of neo-Carnapians 
are undercut.
Kathrin Koslicki, in her essay “Questions of Ontology”, poses the argu-
ment that Carnap, and Quine, and many who follow them miss important 
questions by focusing on existential questions. Koslicki argues that there are 
differing views that would appear very similar under Carnap’s internal/ex-
ternal distinction. She works through difference between pure and impure 
trope theory to show where they agree and disagree. The important point of 
disagreement comes when considering whether tropes are “relatively or ab-
solutely fundamental entities within their respective ontologies.” Both pure 
and impure trope theory would answer the existential questions the same 
way under Carnap’s internal/external distinction. However, key difference 
arise in their theories based on this distinction. Numerical identity for pure 
tropes is tied to tropes themselves while it is tied to the bearers of tropes on 
impure trope theory. She derived further differences in their theories from 
this, such as the possibility of “free-floating” tropes and briefly mentions 
humean and anti-humean leanings concerning the laws of nature. Believing 
that she has shown that these sorts of questions about fundamentality are 
important questions, Koslicki argues that a meatontology which would not 
capture distinctions in this question, as Carnap’s wouldn’t, miss something. 
She then points out that, if questions of being are not exhausted by ques-
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tions of existence, then purporting to show that ontological questions are 
not important because existential questions are trivial or non-factual fails.
The readings above exemplify a few of the important questions consid-
ered throughout the book. There are some that focus more on interpreta-
tion of Carnap, or whether neo-Carnapians have truly captured a Carnapian 
view. This book, in general, does a good job of covering many facets of one 
view on contemporary meta-ontology. It is a book to be recommended to 
anyone who has an interest in contemporary meta-ontology, and in particu-
lar those debating over deflationist meta-ontology.
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